Journal of Student Financial Aid
Volume 36

Issue 3

Article 6

12-1-2006

Book Review: Reading a Commissioner: A Review of Going Broke
by Degree: Why College Costs Too Much
Rupert Wilkinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jsfa

Recommended Citation
Wilkinson, Rupert (2006) "Book Review: Reading a Commissioner: A Review of Going Broke by Degree:
Why College Costs Too Much," Journal of Student Financial Aid: Vol. 36 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.55504/0884-9153.1193
Available at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jsfa/vol36/iss3/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Student Financial Aid by an authorized administrator of
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
thinkir@louisville.edu.

READING A COMMISSIONER
A Review of Going Broke by Degree: Why
College Costs Too Much
By Rupert Wilkinson
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in the United Kingdom and
author of Aiding Students,
Buying Students (2005).

R

ichard Vedder, Distinguished Professor of Economics at
Ohio University, has been described as the most “outspoken (and most entertaining) member” of that fractious
body, the U.S. Secretary of Education’s Commission on the
Future of Higher Education (Lederman, 2006, ¶13). Two years
before the Commission’s final report in September 2006, Vedder published his own book-length critique of American higher
education: Going Broke by Degree: Why College Costs Too Much
(Vedder, 2004).
Vedder’s book has much to say about financial aid and
college pricing. While making numerous proposals for controlling the cost escalation that seems to turn so much of financial
aid into a desperate effort to keep up, he claims that financial
aid itself helps cause the escalation. It should be noted that the
national body to which he was appointed—the Commission on
the Future of Higher Education--was much concerned with quality and accountability in higher education as well as access and
student aid. Turning the tables and holding this commissioner
accountable for the quality of his own quality of work, we can
ask ourselves, did he write a good book?
The short answer is no. Going Broke by Degree is laden
with contradiction, gaps in the exposition, relevant research
ignored, error, and a style that moves between a general, breezy
readability and sudden, unexplained jargon.
And yet Vedder’s book has value. Deploying an ingenious
array of studies, it challenges the conventional wisdom that
more public investment in higher education will necessarily
benefit the economy. And several of his specific proposals for
containing college costs and prices—especially his ideas about
reducing program duplication between campuses—deserve serious thought.
The nub of Vedder’s thesis is this: shielded from market
discipline by government and private subsidies, colleges do not
spend their money as efficiently as business firms. Instead,
they have been allowed to develop bad and lax practices. They
have cut faculty teaching loads while “cross-subsidizing” research—too much of it trivial—with funds from undergraduate
tuition. Campus administrators and professional support staff
have multiplied far more than faculty, but the privilege of faculty tenure balkanizes the university into fiefdoms that resist
the efficient reallocation of resources. While politically correct
conformity flourishes, students are mollycoddled with luxurious
facilities and slack academic demands.
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As a result of all this, a state whose public spending on
higher education grows more as a proportion of personal income
per capita than a similar, neighboring state is likely to see less
economic growth—less increase in per capita income—than its
neighbor. Despite the employment and quality of life produced
by academic communities, state spending on other sectors is
more economically productive.
If higher education does not shape up, Vedder warns,
other sources of further education and research, including forprofit colleges and high-tech business, will make serious inroads
into the markets of public and nonprofit private colleges, depriving them of tuition revenue and research grants.
In the absence of radical shifts in higher-education funding, Vedder would have the states direct their subsidies more
selectively to reward reductions in bureaucracy and promote
cost containment. Ideally, though, Vedder would switch virtually
all state subsidies into tuition vouchers for students, scaled according to their incomes. Armed with these vouchers and existing federal and other aid, students would vote with their feet,
exerting consumer pressure on state colleges to deliver better
service at lower cost.
The case for vouchers, in various shapes and forms, is
not new, but Vedder does not argue it well. For one thing, it is
not clear how his scheme would treat private nonprofit colleges,
since the state appropriations to be replaced by the vouchers
would go almost entirely to state institutions. Initially, it seems,
the vouchers would be usable only at state and community colleges, although Vedder does not say this explicitly. Ideally, Vedder
declares he would like to privatize the public colleges and end
direct subsidies of colleges by public and private donors in favor
of student vouchers. But would he really want to eliminate all
private donations and legacies to colleges? And how would he
achieve this awesome feat?
Still more confusingly, having criticized private as well as
public subsidies for reducing consumer “price sensitivity” and
thus encouraging price rises, Vedder accepts the role of private
philanthropy in saving something precious but vulnerable like
a classics department.
Vedder’s difficulties with vouchers reflect his general
muddle about financial aid. He says repeatedly that all student
aid from outside the colleges, including federal loans and tax
credits, drives up college prices on the general economic principle
that subsidized demand causes price rises. Why then would
not vouchers do the same? If there is a difference, Vedder does
not explain it. Nor does he mention the studies prompted by
Education Secretary William Bennett’s charge in the 1980s that
expanded federal aid, increasing student purchasing power, was
captured by colleges in the form of higher prices. The studies,
on balance, have largely discredited Bennett’s claim (Wilkinson,
2005, pp 57-58; Long, 2006, pp 3-5).
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Vedder’s treatment of the huge growth in student loans
is also inadequate. He presents student loans as an easy ride,
with “below-market interest rates” and “generous pay-back provisions,” noting that some are “even forgiven.” His comments do
not consider that the prospect and burden of debt can dampen
demand for college by deterring students from applying, especially those in low-income families. On the contrary, he briskly
avers that many students in their late teens do not understand
or worry about “meeting debt obligations” (Vedder, 2004, pp.
20-21).
In discussing grant aid awarded by colleges themselves,
Vedder focuses mainly on private, nonprofit colleges. Scholarships, he aptly notes, are a form of price discount. Using intimate customer information provided by student statements of
financial need, colleges can fine-tune their price offers to different
individuals, whereas even the airlines (whose multitude of fares
is often likened to college pricing) can only “price discriminate”
between broad categories of customers.
In both colleges and airlines, varying the price can increase revenue. Vedder recognizes what college presidents have
known from at least the early nineteenth century: if you have
unfilled capacity, need-based scholarships can operate like any
commercial discount, increasing enrollment (sales) and revenue.
It is better to get that extra student who is paying something—
even if it is only room and board—than to have no student.
To have this effect, the scholarships do not actually have
to be need-based, but Vedder does not observe this. Instead his
discussion of non-need-based merit scholarships is concentrated
on colleges with differing but high academic selectivity, as if
unselective colleges do not give merit-based awards.
Unfortunately for Vedder’s exposition, he depicts a situation in which Columbia University and Northwestern University
decide to whom they should give big merit scholarships on the
basis of students’ academic records. Anyone who studies financial aid is aware that Columbia does not give merit-based aid.
The Ivy League universities, including Columbia and some other
institutions with very high selectivity and strong traditions of
need-based aid, eschew buying talent with merit scholarships
and can afford their principles. Northwestern, for its part, has
resisted giving academic merit awards despite strong competition from peers who give them. It does now fund some limited
National Merit awards and some merit awards in music. (Vedder
should have known this: he is a Northwestern alumnus.)
As Vedder observes, the many colleges that do give meritbased awards tend to award them to students who will raise the
student body’s quality, as measured by SAT/ACT scores and
high-school class rank, and so, hopefully, improve the college’s
ratings in U.S. News & World Report and other influential ranking
sources. The same often applies to the “preferential packaging”
of need-based aid (more grant, less loan or work-study) for more
desired students, although Vedder does not address that.
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There is an important difference here between higher
education and most commercial business. Some of a college’s
student customers are also suppliers, providing quality, diversity,
and other characteristics that the college prizes. These characteristics may have market value in that they attract other students (customers), but they will also fit the college’s educational
purposes: good students and diverse students contribute to the
campus environment. Vedder says little about the educational
and social purposes of financial aid given by colleges. This may
explain why he overlooks the unique customer/supplier feature
of colleges, though the chapter in which he discusses college
admissions and financial aid—titled “The New Peculiar Institution”—focuses on what is unusual about higher education
compared with commercial business.
Despite his free-market preferences, Vedder does not
always approve when colleges act like market operators by trying to increase their revenue as much as possible with various
spending purposes. He rightly perceives that scholarships enable
colleges to raise the full tuition charged to their wealthier students by providing financial aid discounts to those who cannot
pay the full price. Vedder implies that this is price gouging. He
also does not note that merit scholarships go disproportionately
to richer students.
On the subject of admissions and alumni, Vedder gives
short shrift to the market economics he usually espouses. Using
Daniel Golden’s Wall Street Journal exposes, he cites vivid, and
indeed shocking, examples of admissions preferences for alumni
and other families likely to give big money to the college. As he
and others have observed, this belies the “concept of meritocracy” to which modern American higher education subscribes
(Vedder, 2004, p. 75; Golden, April 2003, p. A1; Golden, Oct.
2003, p. B1).
As an economist, however, Vedder should recognize that
colleges—especially nonprofit private ones—have two markets:
a customer market and a donor market, in somewhat the same
way that business corporations have investor markets as well as
customer markets. In the donor market, colleges compete with
other charitable enterprises for money that enhances programs
and, in their case, funds scholarships, which is a favorite object of college donors. Admissions tips to alumni “legacies” and
“development admits” (children of likely big donors) are part of
the process. Vedder may not like it, but he should recognize
the tension between market and meritocracy. I suspect he does
not see it like this because he views college donations not as a
market matter but as “third-party” subsidies, i.e., external to
what colleges get paid by their student customers. In fact they
are both.
In the case of expanding college bureaucracy, Vedder
again neglects a market factor. He gives compelling figures
showing that the number of administrators and non-faculty
VOL. 36, NO. 3, 2006
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“professionals” per hundred students (full-time equivalents)
nearly doubled between 1976-77 and 1999-2000 whereas
faculty grew by nine per cent. He has no real explanation for
this except to guess that much of it went on research support.
Robert Zemsky, another higher education commissioner, and
two co-authors give a better picture of this in their book, Remaking the University: Market-Smart, Mission-Centered (Zemsky,
Wegner, and Massy, 2005). They attribute the growth of college
administrators to office empire-building, encouraged in turn by
faculty abandonment of student advising to support staff and
by student demand for more services.
In other words, the growth of administration decried by
Vedder is in part a response to the very market forces (customer
demand) that he venerates. Likewise, the new dorms and fancy
student centers, which Vedder sees as wasteful luxuries, are
part of what colleges do to compete for business. Vedder also
neglects the market in proposing an increase in full-time faculty
teaching loads. The proposal has merit (dare I say it) but does
not address the fact that many colleges compete for good faculty
via teaching and research conditions, not just remuneration.
When Vedder does apply market principles, the result
can be unfair and possibly self-defeating. His handling of career-long faculty tenure is a case in point. Vedder admits he is
“highly ambivalent” about the tenure system. While agreeing that
it protects “free speech and expression,” he also believes that
it enables entrenched professors to “block new initiatives and
to maintain costly, outmoded programs” (Vedder, 2004, p. 217)
His solution: make tenure an optional benefit that a qualifying
professor can buy. Vedder says nothing about the regressiveness
of this solution, which would clearly favor wealthier faculty who
are most able to buy tenure. And it would still enable key faculty
to entrench themselves and their courses.
Perhaps the strongest chapter of the book is the one
that takes us through state-based studies of higher education’s
economic payoffs, both for graduates and for society (what economists call “externalities”), and the relationship between state
investment in higher education and economic growth, already
summarized above (Vedder, 2004, chapter 7). Vedder does not
deny the payoffs of higher education, but he issues salutary
warnings. He observes that some of the increasing income difference between graduates and non-graduates may be due to what
others have called a “sheepskin” effect or “credentialism”—the
initial career advantages of being able to show employers a college degree rather than the education itself. It may also be that
college graduates earn more because of the kind of people who go
to college and graduate; social scientists in the field call this the
“alpha” effect. Unfortunately, Vedder does not mention studies
that have tried to explore the extent and limits of these factors
(e.g., Park, 1993; Leslie and Brinkman, 1994).
On the general relationship between higher education and
economic growth, Vedder notes that some of the relationship may
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be a reverse one. He speculates that college-educated people
tend to move to areas with high economic growth. He might
also have observed that richer communities tend to want more
higher education.
Like Alison Wolf, the British educationist and labor
economist, Vedder warns that just because higher education
has appeared so far to assist economic growth in both our countries does not mean that putting more and more people through
college will go on growing the economy (Wolf, 2002). There is a
limit, even in a “knowledge economy,” to how many graduates
the economy needs. Vedder argues indeed that the relationship
between a state’s economic growth and the graduate proportion
of its adults is weakening. For those of us who want to equalize
educational opportunity, there is a lesson here. It has always
been tempting to try to justify principles of social fairness by
hard-headed economics and to claim, in this case, that extending
higher education to more and more people will benefit the whole
economy. The principle of social fairness, however, should stand
on its own feet. Whatever proportion of adults goes to college,
equalizing the opportunity to get there and the financial burdens
thereof should make its own appeal to democratic justice.
Vedder is not much into this. Although he supports
need-based aid, his reform agenda does not include provision for
helping disadvantaged students with college potential to realize
that potential—and he is no friend of affirmative action. Still,
his book makes one think about these issues. More generally,
too, for all its flaws, perhaps indeed because of them, Going
Broke by Degree provokes thought about the peculiar nature of
modern American higher education and its mixture of mission,
self-interest, and market influences.
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